The U.S.-China Meeting and the New Economy of Resilience
[4m 22s read]
Technical University of Crete, Data Analysis and Forecasting Laboratory
In a world that is moving from the globalization of efficiency to the geoeconomics of security, the forthcoming meeting in Washington between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping is not only about tariffs, the trade balance, or bilateral relations. Xi is making an official visit to the United States from 23 to 25 September 2026, with the formal White House welcome scheduled for 24 September. The agenda includes trade, rare-earth elements, artificial intelligence, technology restrictions, and broader issues of strategic stability.
Behind the individual negotiations, however, lies a much deeper transformation. The world’s two largest economies are trying to answer the same question: how can an economy remain open without also remaining vulnerable?
For roughly three decades, globalization was organized around efficiency. Businesses sought the cheapest factory, the lowest-cost supplier, and the shortest production chain. The basic principle was simple: produce where costs are lowest and move the product to where demand exists.
Today, that logic is changing. The crucial question is no longer only “Where can this be produced most cheaply?” but also “What happens if that supplier stops supplying us tomorrow?”
Economic interdependence is becoming a strategic risk: The United States and China are perhaps the clearest example of this new reality. The two economies remain deeply interdependent, yet both are trying to reduce their most critical dependencies.
Washington is seeking greater domestic or allied production capacity in semiconductors, batteries, critical minerals, and advanced technologies. Beijing, for its part, is accelerating its drive for technological autonomy, seeking to reduce its dependence on U.S. chips, software, and technology platforms.
At the same time, rare-earth elements have become a central subject of negotiation. The U.S. side is pressing for an easing of Chinese restrictions on critical-mineral exports, while China is seeking looser restrictions on access to advanced U.S. technologies.
This is not merely a commercial issue. An advanced semiconductor can be used in a car, a data center, an artificial intelligence system, or military equipment. A rare-earth element may be essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics, and advanced defense systems. This means that supply chains are no longer merely commercial mechanisms. They have become infrastructures of national power.
From efficiency to resilience: Economic resilience does not mean self-sufficiency. No major economy can produce everything on its own without incurring enormous costs. It does mean, however, that critical dependencies must be manageable.
An economy is resilient when it has alternative energy suppliers, diversified trade relationships, secure digital networks, an adequate production base, and the ability to continue operating when a critical international flow is disrupted. This is precisely the shift from simple economic efficiency to strategic resilience.
The problem is that resilience has a cost. The most efficient company may rely on a single supplier, minimal inventories, and one large factory in a low-cost country. The more resilient company needs two or three suppliers, larger inventories, different transport routes, and often production facilities in different geographic regions.
In narrow accounting terms, this is more expensive. In geoeconomic terms, however, it is a form of insurance. The United States and China are not really negotiating the end of their interdependence; they are negotiating the terms of that interdependence.
Artificial intelligence at the center of the new confrontation: Artificial intelligence adds a new dimension. The two governments have already agreed to establish a formal dialogue on AI safety, and another meeting of officials in Shenzhen has been announced for the next two months. The discussions include, among other issues, communication mechanisms for incidents involving advanced artificial intelligence systems.
This matters because AI is not simply a new software application. It requires an enormous physical infrastructure: advanced semiconductors, data centers, electricity, networks, cooling systems, data, and specialized human capital. In other words, whoever controls the critical layers of this chain acquires both economic and strategic power.
This is where technology and resilience converge. A country may have a strong economy, but if it depends on a single foreign supplier for advanced chips, critical minerals, or cloud infrastructure, that dependence can become a source of leverage during a conflict. In the twenty-first century, state power increasingly depends on access to capital, energy, semiconductors, data, digital networks, and other critical infrastructures.
The new balance: not decoupling, but “managed dependence”: This explains why complete economic decoupling between the United States and China is extremely difficult and probably extremely costly.
The two countries may compete in AI, chips, batteries, and critical technologies, but in many sectors each still needs the other’s markets, capital, technology, or production base.
A telling example is the U.S. battery startup EnerVenue, which recently chose to build its first factory in China rather than in Kentucky, citing the mature supplier network, available engineering expertise, and lower costs. The case shows that industrial resilience cannot be created simply through tariffs or subsidies; it requires entire industrial ecosystems. Conversely, many Chinese startups prefer to list on U.S. stock exchanges.
This may be the most important lesson for Europe. A factory is not merely a building. It is the suppliers, engineers, energy grid, logistics, skills, financing, and know-how that surround it.
The U.S.-China meeting concerns the entire world: The Trump-Xi meeting therefore matters far beyond a conventional trade negotiation. Both sides have an interest in limiting the risk of an uncontrolled economic rupture, without abandoning their efforts to reduce strategic vulnerabilities.
China says it is seeking “strategic stability,” more dialogue, and better management of disagreements, while the U.S. side has linked the talks to trade, unfair competition, critical minerals, investment, and technology.
The result will not necessarily be a return to the old globalization. A different form of globalization is more likely to emerge: greater cooperation where interests coincide, more intense competition in critical technologies, and greater diversification of strategic supply chains.
The basic measure of economic power is changing. It is no longer enough for a country to have a high GDP. It must be able to sustain its production, energy supply, digital services, and financing when the international system is hit by a shock.
It is not enough to have access to critical flows. A country must be able to replace them when they are interrupted. It is not enough to be efficient. It must be able to absorb a crisis.
That is why economic resilience is becoming one of the most important indicators of national power. The strongest country is not necessarily the one that depends on no one – something almost impossible in the modern economy. It is the one that can manage its dependencies and prevent interdependence from becoming a one-sided vulnerability.
The U.S.-China meeting shows us precisely this new reality. The two superpowers are not simply trying to secure more trade. They are trying to determine which dependencies they can tolerate, which technologies they must control, and which networks they cannot leave in the other side’s hands.
In the twenty-first century, economic power will no longer be measured only by how cheaply a country can produce.
It will be measured by how quickly it can adapt when the world stops functioning as we know it.
